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This article conceptualizes the evolution of the German political economy as the 
codevelopment of technological and institutional change. The notion of skill-biased 
liberalization is introduced to capture this process and contrasted with the two 
dominant theoretical frameworks employed in contemporary comparative political 
economy scholarship—dualization and liberalization. Integrating theories from labor 
economics, the article argues that the increasing centrality of high skills complementary 
in production to information and communications technology has weakened the 
traditional complementarity among specific skills, regulated industrial relations, and 
generous social protection in core sectors. The liberalization of industrial relations 
and social protection is shown in fact to be instrumental for high-end exporting firms 
to concentrate wages and benefits on increasingly important high-skilled workers. 
Strong evidence based on descriptive statistics, union and industry documents, and 
twenty-one elite interviews is found in support of the article’s alternative perspective.
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The transition from Fordism to the knowledge economy has seen extensive structural 
and institutional change in the advanced democracies. It has been characterized by 
deindustrialization, the rise of mass systems of higher education, greater female labor 
force participation, more dynamic and differentiated product markets, increasingly 
global supply chains, and a weakening of unions and collective bargaining.1 The foun-
dational comparative political economy (CPE) work of varieties of capitalism (VoC) 
expects “coordinated” market economies to adjust to common pressures, such as glo-
balization and technological change, by safeguarding the traditional coordinating 
institutions—regulated labor markets and generous social protection—that incentivize 
the acquisition of specific skills and underpin a comparative advantage in incremen-
tally innovative industries (i.e., traditional manufacturing).2
In Germany, the archetypal coordinated market economy in the VoC framework, 
however, the transition to the knowledge economy has come with major disruptions in 
political-economic institutions. CPE scholars have therefore turned their attention to 
assessing the far-reaching institutional changes that have taken place and the extent to 
which they undermine the “German model.” Two approaches have come to dominate 
the literature in this field: the dualization and liberalization perspectives. The former 
argues that institutional change has been largely confined to the service sector periph-
ery and that traditional coordinating institutions still operate relatively unchanged in 
the core manufacturing sectors.3 Conversely, the latter argues that sweeping institu-
tional change in a liberal direction has been a key feature of both the service sector and 
the industrial core in recent decades.4
The key site of contestation between these existing perspectives is the manufactur-
ing sector, but both these perspectives are missing an important part of the story, as 
they fail to adequately account for the fundamental transformation that advanced 
manufacturing has undergone during the transition to the knowledge economy. The 
increasing importance of information and communications technology (ICT) to prod-
ucts and production processes in manufacturing means the sector has changed beyond 
recognition in recent decades. Take the global automobile industry as an example. 
While the ICT equipment and software in a typical car contained around 100 lines of 
computer code in the 1970s, that figure is close to 10 million today. It is also esti-
mated that ICT now contributes 30–40 percent of total value added in automobile 
construction.5 The changes on the production side have been no less dramatic, with 
the rapid proliferation of automation in the sector; between 2012 and 2017 alone, 
industrial robot sales to the global automotive industry increased by 14 percent per 
year on average.6 As a leader in the global automobile industry, this transformation 
has profoundly affected the German manufacturing sector, with rising spending on 
product innovation, the creation of a large number of jobs in white-collar occupations 
and R&D, and an increasingly high-skilled workforce.7
In this article, we propose an alternative perspective on Germany’s transition to the 
knowledge economy that seeks to address the crucial shortcoming of the existing lit-
erature. We argue that the evolution of the German political economy since the turn of 
the century is best captured through the lens of liberalization and technological change, 
which we conceptualize as skill-biased liberalization. Our approach draws on theories 
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of technological change from labor economics.8 In particular, we argue that (1) a surge 
in the ICT-intensity of manufacturing has shifted the skills needs of manufacturing 
firms toward workers with tertiary education, especially in STEM (science, technol-
ogy, engineering, and mathematics) subjects; (2) the increased centrality of high-level 
general skills in advanced manufacturing has weakened the traditional institutional 
complementarity between specific skills, regulated industrial relations, and generous 
social protection; and (3) liberalization across the industrial relations and social pro-
tection arenas has been instrumental for high-end exporting firms to concentrate wages 
and benefits on highly educated workers.
In order to assess the empirical support for our alternative perspective, we explore 
changes in the German manufacturing sector and three key spheres of the German 
political economy (skill formation, industrial relations, and social policy) by drawing 
on descriptive statistics, industry reports and surveys, union publications and state-
ments, and a set of twenty-one elite interviews with key stakeholders in German man-
ufacturing. We find strong support for our alternative skill-biased liberalization 
perspective and demonstrate that it fits the empirical evidence better than the existing 
dualization or liberalization perspectives.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present the existing litera-
ture in greater detail and develop our alternative theoretical perspective. We then dis-
cuss our data collection, before presenting the empirical evidence in support of our 
argument. We first trace the changes that have taken place in the German manufactur-
ing sector, with a specific focus on the increase in ICT intensity. We then examine 
institutional and policy changes in the three key spheres of skill formation, industrial 
relations and labor markets, and social protection. Last, we discuss the implications of 
our research for the CPE literature and provide concluding remarks.
The Transition to the Knowledge Economy in Germany: 
Dualization, Liberalization, and an Alternative 
Theoretical Approach
Explaining patterns of institutional change in Germany’s political economy has been a 
focal point of recent debates in CPE scholarship, owing to the centrality of the German 
case in seminal contributions to the discipline. The point of departure for much of the 
debate has been the varieties of capitalism framework and the dichotomy between 
liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs).9 The 
VoC framework implied that CMEs—typified by Germany—would navigate the tran-
sition to the knowledge economy by doubling down on their comparative advantage in 
incrementally innovative sectors, owing to a specifically skilled workforce nurtured 
by a set of institutions that included regulated labor markets and generous social 
protection.10 That proposition has been challenged by recent empirical developments, 
including a number of far-reaching reforms that have disrupted the core institutions of 
the “German model”—most notably, but not exclusively, the Hartz reforms of the 
early 2000s. The key question in the literature has thus become how to account for 
those disruptions and their wider ramifications. In providing different answers to the 
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question, two approaches have come to dominate the debate: the dualization and the 
liberalization perspectives.
The central claim of the dualization literature is that Germany has indeed under-
gone profound change but that the change does not hold across the entire political 
economy: the service sector periphery was deeply affected, while the core manufactur-
ing sectors were left relatively untouched. German manufacturing, according to this 
view, therefore still relies on much the same coordinating institutions championed 
by VoC, while the service sector has expanded in a more deregulated and liberalized 
fashion.11 Scholars point to the organization of producer groups along sectoral lines as 
a crucial explanatory factor for continuity in the core manufacturing sector, alongside 
an increasingly deregulated periphery characterized by many of the features tradition-
ally associated with labor markets in LMEs (e.g., precarious employment and low 
pay). The core theoretical and empirical tenets of the dualization thesis have been 
crystalized in the work of Kathleen Thelen. Descriptively, dualization manifests itself 
as a form of institutional change in which traditional institutions are resilient in form 
but shrink in coverage, leading to the growth of an “unregulated periphery” where 
firms and workers are “characterized by inferior status and protections.”12 At the 
explanatory level, the dualization thesis identifies a cross-class coalition in core sec-
tors as the engine of institutional change, whereby “an intensification of cooperation 
between labor and management in core firms and industries . . . leave[s] other firms 
and workers behind or outside.”13
The dualization perspective adds a dynamic dimension to VoC as it offers to account 
for continuity (in core sectors) and change (in peripheral sectors) simultaneously, but 
it has been challenged on the grounds of overemphasizing stability in Germany’s 
industrial core.14 A growing collection of work, which can broadly be categorized as 
“liberalization scholarship,” has argued forcefully that Germany’s institutional makeup 
has been radically transformed in a decidedly liberal direction in both peripheral and 
core sectors. Wolfgang Streeck’s contributions have been central to the growth and 
proliferation of liberalization scholarship. By analyzing long-standing developments 
in the realms of collective bargaining, intermediary organizations, social policy, cor-
porate governance, and public finance, Streeck notes an overall movement “away 
from centralized authoritative coordination and control toward dispersed competition, 
individual instead of collective action, and spontaneous, market-like aggregation of 
preferences and decisions” across the German political economy.15 Employers are 
found to have been at the forefront of this “common neoliberal trajectory,”16 as they 
vehemently lobbied to liberalize labor markets, pushing for a weakening of collective 
bargaining institutions and a retrenchment of social protection schemes.17
A notable consequence of continuous liberalization, it is argued, has been the emer-
gence of growing segments of the labor market characterized by in-work poverty and 
casual employment as well as by harsh workfare measures in lieu of generous unem-
ployment benefits.18 Employer preferences for liberalization have typically been 
explained in terms of cutting labor costs to ensure export competitiveness in increas-
ingly globalized markets.19 Thus, the liberalization thesis stands in stark contrast to the 
dualization thesis on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Empirically, it illustrates 
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the erosion of traditional coordinating institutions in both core and peripheral sectors; 
theoretically, where dualization scholars identify a cross-class coalition, liberalization 
scholars see class conflict, with employers attacking traditional institutions and unions 
struggling to defend them.
As hypothesized by liberalization scholars, processes of liberalization have 
indeed been profound in Germany—and especially throughout the 2000s. Figure 1 
provides evidence in this respect. It shows the share of liberalizing—that is, market 
enhancing—reforms across the three main subspheres of the German political econ-
omy since the mid-1970s.20 We can see that liberalizations make up a higher share 
of reforms in skill formation, industrial relations, and social policy as time goes on. 
In the 2000s, for instance, 72 percent of reforms in these subspheres were in a lib-
eralizing direction, and nearly a third of these liberalizations were “major” in their 
significance and depth.
Figure 1. Share of liberalizing reforms in skill formation, industrial relations, and social 
policy in Germany from the mid-1970s to the 2000s. Darker parts of bars show proportion 
of major liberalizations. Authors’ calculations using data from Klaus Armingeon et al., 
Liberalization Database—37 Countries, 1973–2013 (Bern and Geneva, 2019), liberalization.org. 
Data combine reforms in seven policy fields that map onto the three subspheres analyzed 
in this article as follows. Skill formation = education, excluding vocational training (edu) 
and vocational training (voctr); industrial relations = employment protection legislation 
(epl) and industrial relations (ir); and social policy = active labor market policies (almp), 
nonemployment benefits (neb), and pension policies (pen). Liberalization = removal 
of market barriers or loosening of restrictions on free markets. Liberalizing reform = 
permanent or temporary liberalizing change adopted by government/parliament or interest 
groups or court mandated that qualifies as a policy field discontinuity. Major liberalizations 
score 1 or above on the liberalization incisiveness index (lib), which aims to capture 
significance and depth of reform. Full definitions of policy fields and variables are available at 
https://liberalization.org/images/Codebook.pdf.
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Although we agree with the liberalization view that core sectors have not been 
spared from marked institutional change, we contend that the liberalization perspec-
tive is incomplete. Liberalization is not the only phenomenon that swept across 
advanced capitalist countries during this period. In parallel to the sustained process of 
liberalization captured by Figure 1, the last two decades were also characterized by a 
trend toward knowledge-based growth.21 Table 1 shows the changes in Germany since 
the turn of the century in the proportion of working-age individuals with tertiary edu-
cation, the entry rate into tertiary education for those under age twenty-five, the num-
ber of researchers, and gross R&D expenditure.
Taken together, Figure 1 and Table 1 suggest that the transition to the knowledge 
economy in Germany can hardly be captured through the lens of liberalization alone. 
Rather, it requires understanding how liberalization and knowledge-based growth 
codeveloped over the last two decades, given that the two phenomena have largely 
overlapped since the early 2000s.22 To that end, we put forward an alternative perspec-
tive that integrates theories of technological change from labor economics, which 
posit that the adoption of ICT in workplaces has asymmetric effects on workers. The 
two eminent theories of technological change in labor economics are skill-biased tech-
nological change (SBTC) and routine-biased technological change (RBTC).23 
According to both, ICT is complementary to high-skilled workers, as it enables them 
to do their jobs more effectively, whereas it substitutes for workers lower down the 
skill distribution, particularly those who focus on tasks that can be easily replicated by 
computers or machines. Technological change therefore increases the relative demand 
for high-skilled labor, which leads ceteris paribus to an increase in the wage premia for 
university-educated workers.24
More specifically, we argue—and demonstrate in the following section—that 
technological change has played a pivotal role in transforming the German manufac-
turing sector in recent decades. A surge in the ICT intensity of advanced manufactur-
ing has shifted the skills needs of manufacturing businesses toward workers with 
Table 1. The Shift into Knowledge-Based Growth in Germany, 2000–2018.
2000 2018 Change 2000–2018
Percentage of those twenty-four to  
sixty-five years old with tertiary education 23.5 29.9 +6.4
Entry rate into tertiary education for those 
under twenty-five 31 45 +14
Researchers (per 1,000 employed) 6.5 9.7 +3.2
Gross domestic spending on R&D 
(percentage of GDP) 2.4 3.1 +0.7
Source: Full variable definitions and OECD indicators for researchers, gross domestic spending on 
R&D, and adult education level are from https://data.oecd.org, through searches for “Education” and 
“Innovation and Technology.” Definition of entry rate variable available is from oecd.org/education/
education-at-a-glance/. Data on entry rates obtained from searching “entry rates” on https://stats.oecd.
org/. Entry rate into tertiary education in 2000 is actually from 2005, as the variable is unavailable before 
that date.
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tertiary education, especially in STEM subjects, which has further undermined exist-
ing institutional complementarities in the German political economy. In a context of 
liberalization and technological change, institutional changes in the industrial rela-
tions and social protection arenas have been instrumental for business to concentrate 
wages and nonwage benefits on increasingly important highly skilled workers. We 
refer to this as skill-biased liberalization.
Conceptualizing the transition to the knowledge economy in Germany as the 
codevelopment of liberalization and technological change allows us to advance a set 
of theoretical propositions that stand apart from the dualization thesis and that qual-
ify the liberalization view. Our core contention is that—contra dualization and in 
line with liberalization—(1) profound changes did not spare core sectors of the 
German political economy and (2) these changes are best understood as the outcome 
of class conflict in which employers challenge traditional institutional arrangements 
and prevail over unions that, in turn, seek to safeguard them to little avail. However, 
by embedding technological change in our framework, we argue that employers’ 
preferences are likely to be more nuanced than hypothesized by the liberalization 
literature: on one hand, employers do push for deregulation and retrenchment in 
industrial relations and social protection; but at the same time they seek to redeploy 
these institutions to be able to reward and retain the highly skilled workers who have 
become vital for their production strategies in the era of knowledge-based growth. 
In our view, the transition to the knowledge economy is therefore best explained by 
taking into account the effects of technological change in increasingly liberalized 
political economies.
In a nutshell, we can thus identify a distinct logic of institutional adjustment for 
each theoretical perspective. In a dualization world, institutional change takes place 
predominantly in peripheral sectors, while continuity prevails in core sectors. A cross-
class alliance between employers and unions is at the heart of this logic: both capital 
and labor get their way in core sectors, while labor in peripheral sectors sees its posi-
tion compromised. In a liberalization world, deregulation of labor markets, decentral-
ization of collective bargaining, and retrenchment of social protection take place in 
both core and periphery. The key actor driving this process is business, which success-
fully pushes for liberalizing reforms against the opposition of the unions. In a world of 
skill-biased liberalization, characterized by liberalization and technological change, 
institutional adjustment equally takes place in both core and periphery. However, it is 
marked by two parallel processes: while employers push for liberalization, they also 
seek to redeploy wages and nonwage benefits toward those workers whose skills are 
complementary to technology and who are therefore central to firms’ production strat-
egies in the knowledge economy. In this scenario, capital and high-skilled workers 
stand to win, while labor lower down the skill distribution loses out.
As summarized in Table 2, we can derive a set of observable implications for each 
of these three theoretical approaches in relation to the three subspheres of the political 
economy that have been central to CPE scholarship and that will be analyzed in this 
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Before moving to the empirical analysis, a clarification of the role of unions in our 
proposed framework is warranted. Unlike the dualization perspective, both the liberal-
ization and the skill-biased liberalization perspectives imply that employers drive 
change as first movers, while unions seek to defend the existing institutions and, by 
extension, their traditional constituencies (i.e., specifically skilled workers in the mid-
dle of the skill distribution). However, the increasing importance of knowledge-based 
growth (Table 1) suggests that a growing segment of the labor market is now made up 
of highly skilled workers who have traditionally been beyond the scope of union rep-
resentation. This creates a dilemma: unions can either turn inward and prioritize the 
(shrinking) core of their membership that relies on the traditional set of institutional 
complementarities, or they can embrace the changed institutional landscape and adopt 
strategies to cater to nontraditional types of members.26 The recent CPE literature sug-
gests that labor unions in Germany (and beyond) have indeed revisited their strategies 
to avoid further marginalization.27 We treat this as an open empirical question on 
which our analysis can shed additional light.
Data Collection and Analysis
Our empirical investigation is based on an in-depth case study of the German manu-
facturing sector, the key site of contestation between the existing theoretical perspec-
tives on the evolution of the German political economy and our alternative approach. 
It therefore provides the appropriate testing ground to assess the empirical support for 
our argument. For in-depth, single-country case study research, it is well advised to 
draw on as broad a range of empirical material as possible, including statistical data, 
official statements and reports, and pertinent secondary sources. Where necessary and 
feasible, this material can be triangulated with supplementary data gathered through 
interviews with relevant stakeholders. Our article engages all of the above, in order to 
investigate recent changes in the German manufacturing sector as well as changes that 
have occurred in the key institutional spheres of skill formation, labor markets and 
industrial relations, and social protection. We leverage descriptive statistics from a 
wide range of sources, including the OECD, the Observatory for Economic Complexity, 
the EU KLEMS data set, the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, the Joint Science 
Conference of the German regions (Länder) and Federal Government (Bund), and the 
German Chambers of Industry and Commerce. We complement these with qualitative 
data from industry surveys and reports, the research outputs of industry-affiliated 
think-tanks, and labor union publications and statements. Finally, we triangulate 
insights from these sources with primary data gathered through twenty-one semistruc-
tured interviews with senior stakeholders in employers’ and workers’ associations and 
government ministries. Details of our methodology, the selection of stakeholders, and 
a full list of interviewees are provided in the Appendix.
German Manufacturing in the Knowledge Economy
The German export machine has been powered by a strikingly similar set of products 
for the past four decades.28 Germany’s top exports in 2017 were cars and vehicle parts, 
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which together accounted for nearly 17 percent of all goods exports (by value in US 
dollars). Germany has also maintained its global preeminence in the export of indus-
trial goods, such as machinery and equipment that are used in the production of other 
goods.29 On the surface then, the picture is one of continuity, but the stability of 
Germany’s export profile obscures the deep and transformational changes that have 
taken place in the manufacturing industry during the transition to the knowledge 
economy.
Take the German carmakers as an example, which have sharply increased expendi-
ture on innovation in recent years, from €26.6 billion in 2009 to €47.4 billion in 2017.30 
They have also seen continuous growth of skilled labor, especially in research and 
development jobs.31 In line with our argument on the importance of ICT to advanced 
manufacturing in the knowledge economy, and contrary to the expectations of the VoC 
framework,32 innovation in the sector has also started to shift away from incremental 
forms of innovation and toward more radical forms of innovation. Since the mid-
2010s, German vehicle manufacturers have registered as many patents that pertain to 
radically innovative technologies (in the areas of digitalization, electric mobility, and 
electronics) as those that pertain to conventional power trains (e.g., combustion 
engines and exhaust systems).33
Against that backdrop, profound change has not been confined to the automotive 
sector alone, as technology has become deeply embedded across German manufactur-
ing industries in general. Germany came at the top of the Bloomberg Innovation Index 
for the first time in 2020, owing to “top-five rankings in value-added manufacturing, 
high-tech density, and patent activity.”34 German exports are heavily concentrated in 
advanced, high-technology goods; 52 percent of German exports were high-tech prod-
ucts in 2015, and another 31 percent were medium-high-tech products.35 Germany is 
currently ranked third in the world on the Economic Complexity Index, which mea-
sures the knowledge intensity of the products a country exports.36 Germany is also a 
leading producer of IT manufactured goods, which include computers, electronics, 
and optical products. The OECD calculates that Germany was Europe’s most “central” 
IT manufacturing hub in 2011, highlighting its influence in global and domestic pro-
duction networks for IT manufactured goods.37 The importance placed on innovation 
of German manufacturing firms is reflected in a substantial expansion in expenditure 
on R&D since the global financial crisis. Figure 2 shows that real business expenditure 
on R&D by firms in the manufacturing sector grew by over 33 percent in the decade 
after 2007.
Moreover, spending on innovation by the metal and electrical industries (Metall- 
und Elektroindustrie) now accounts for almost two-thirds of innovation spending 
in the German economy (62.9 percent in 2017, compared to 55 percent in 2010), 
as manufacturing firms grapple with the challenges and opportunities of the ICT 
revolution.38 For a large number of our interviewees, for instance, the quest for “new 
business models” has become one of the key issues facing German industry in the digi-
tal age: greater service orientation and more focus on product individualization and 
customization are two common developments identified by interview partners.39 In 
this context, manufacturers now increasingly seek employees with wider and more 
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general skill sets in both mechanical or electrical engineering and information technol-
ogy, so as to safeguard their innovative capacity.40
Theories of technological change from labor economics would predict that the 
rapid diffusion of ICT during the transition to the knowledge economy would have 
substantial effects on the workforce in the German manufacturing sector.41 As dis-
cussed in the theory section, we would expect to see greater demand for high-skilled 
workers due to their complementarity with ICT, as well as a movement away from the 
routine tasks that can be easily replicated by computers or machines and toward more 
complex, nonroutine abstract and analytical tasks.42 In line with that hypothesis, Hugh 
Cassidy shows through a task usage shift-share analysis that manufacturing occupa-
tions were shifting away from manual tasks and toward interactive and analytical tasks 
as early as the late 1980s.43
Alongside these changes, German manufacturing firms offshored a large amount of 
labor-intensive upstream production activity to Central and Eastern Europe and other 
emerging economies during the 1990s.44 By the mid-2000s, nearly half of German 
automobile parts suppliers had begun overseas production in Central and Eastern 
Europe.45 Sascha Becker, Karolina Ekholm, and Marc-Andreas Muendler study the 
effects of offshoring on the onshore workforce of German multinational companies 
and find that offshoring is associated with a significant shift toward more highly edu-
cated workers and more interactive and nonroutine tasks.46 The manufacturing jobs 
remaining in Germany have been upgraded and focus more on R&D, management, 
and nonroutine aspects of the production process such as production engineering and 
quality services.47
The rising importance of nonroutine tasks and service occupations in manufactur-
ing workplaces has significantly altered the skill requirements of manufacturing firms: 
Figure 2. Real business enterprise R&D expenditure in manufacturing (2007 = 100) in 
Germany, 2007–17. Underlying data in 2010 US dollars, constant prices, and PPPs. Authors’ 
calculations using data from the OECD data set on business enterprise R&D expenditure by 
industry (as of October 2019), https://stats.oecd.org/.
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there is now greater demand for workers with the high-level general skills (i.e., univer-
sity education) that are complementary to ICT. This chimes in with Dominik Boddin 
and Philipp Henze’s occupational analysis of the German manufacturing sector, which 
finds that the most skilled occupations saw the greatest employment growth between 
1975 and 2010.48 The single biggest employment expansion was for engineers, whose 
employment more than doubled over the period (+106 percent), followed by semipro-
fessionals (+66 percent) and professionals (+51 percent) in service occupations.49 
Those expansions are even more striking as they took place against a backdrop of 
shrinking employment in the manufacturing sector as a whole; manufacturing employ-
ment fell from 32 percent to 19 percent of total employment in Germany between 1975 
and 2006.50 It has also become more common for manufacturing workers to possess 
higher education; the share of workers with tertiary education in high- and medium-
high-tech manufacturing rose from 25 percent in the mid-1990s to 33 percent in 
2016.51
Overall, ICT has increasingly become a cornerstone of the manufacturing sector in 
Germany. In line with theories of technological change from the realm of labor eco-
nomics, the diffusion of ICT has taken place in conjunction with a shift toward high 
skills, service occupations, and complex, nonroutine tasks. The demand for university-
educated workers, especially those with engineering and IT-related degrees, has 
increased dramatically as a result. The transition to the knowledge economy has evi-
dently changed German manufacturing and rendered the recruitment and retention of 
high-skilled workers increasingly vital for continued success in the export of advanced 
manufactured goods.
Institutional Change in German Manufacturing
This section identifies the patterns of institutional change that have occurred alongside 
the technological transformation of Germany’s manufacturing sector since the second 
half of the 1990s and across the three core spheres of skill formation, industrial rela-
tions and labor markets, and social policy.52 In particular, it assesses the extent to 
which the available evidence supports our argument about the mutually reinforcing 
relationship between liberalization and technological change in the German political 
economy during the transition to the knowledge economy.
Skill Formation
Following on the findings of the previous section, the widespread use of ICT in 
German manufacturing has altered the composition of jobs and skills in the sector. The 
centrality of intermediate skills has diminished in the context of the increasing impor-
tance of nonroutine tasks, which calls for higher-level skills. Since the mid-1990s—
and with a stark acceleration from the mid-2000s—higher education has become the 
center of gravity of the German skill-formation system.53 Enrollments at universities 
have skyrocketed, while the number of young people in the dual apprenticeship system 
has decreased (see Fig. 3).
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The expansion of higher education in Germany does not simply reflect the expan-
sion of employment in high-value-added services, as commonly assumed by the CPE 
literature.54 It is also intimately linked with changes in advanced manufacturing, given 
that “industrial production has become increasingly digitalized, decentralized, and 
dependent on workers with high cognitive and analytical skills, causing demand for 
employees with university . . . degrees to rise, while VET training has become rela-
tively less important.”55 Remarkably, since the 2000s, employers in the manufacturing 
sector have pushed for a deregulation of the traditional apprenticeship system. The 
reintroduction of shorter, two-year apprenticeships in 2003 was achieved against the 
opposition of trade unions, who feared that lowering the quality of training would 
facilitate segmentation of the workforce in terms of collective bargaining and wages.56 
The deregulation of the apprenticeship system—which Marius Busemeyer and 
Christine Trampusch have described as “liberalization by exhaustion”57—originated, 
crucially, in the core manufacturing industries, and large export-oriented firms were 
among its most fervent supporters.58
Yet manufacturing employers not only campaigned for—and eventually obtained—
a deregulation of the apprenticeship system in the 2000s but also mobilized in favor of 
expanding higher education and the provision of STEM skills in particular.59 Employers 
ran public campaigns emphasizing the urgency of creating a plentiful and stable 
supply of high-level skills to sustain the backbone of the export-oriented German 
economy.60 The influential metalworking employers’ association (Gesamtmetall) and 
the employers’ peak association (BDA) funded biannual studies to monitor the supply 
of STEM skills (so-called STEM Trend Reports), as well as spearheaded a national 
STEM Forum.61 Similarly, the National Academy of Science and Engineering 
(acatech)—a publicly funded organization advising policymakers on innovation 
policy and technological developments including “Industrie 4.0”—has been at the 
Figure 3. Size of higher education and dual vocational training systems in Germany, 2000–15. 
Adapted from Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Office of Statistics), www.destatus.de.
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forefront of research on skills needs in the transition to the knowledge economy. The 
supply of STEM skills has been a central concern of acatech’s activities, including the 
publication of a yearly report co-commissioned by the entrepreneurs’ foundation 
Körber Stitfung and marketed as a “Barometer of Young Talents in STEM Subjects.” 
According to interviewees, at the heart of these efforts was the motivation to increase 
the supply of high-level skills in order to ensure that German companies reap the ben-
efits associated with technological change, which led employers’ associations to 
become “massively engaged in higher education reform.”62
Consequently, German higher education policy has come to reflect demands for an 
increased supply of STEM skills.63 The federal government launched the Higher 
Education Pact (HEP) in 2007 to fund the expansion of the university sector, tying the 
disbursement of funds to the promotion of STEM subjects in particular, as these 
were seen as pivotal to a successful transition to the knowledge economy.64 As a 
result, since the launch of the pact, intakes in engineering have—in relative terms—
outstripped intakes in any other discipline (see Fig. 4).
In some Länder, the HEP has also been used to fund so-called dual study 
programs.65 Within these, students obtain regular university degrees (typically at the 
undergraduate level) and also extensive work experience in firms that enter a coop-
eration agreement with higher education institutions (usually universities of applied 
sciences). A main reason for employers to sponsor dual study programs is to tie stu-
dents to the firm early on in order to minimize the risk of future skill shortages.66 In 
the distribution of students in dual study programs, engineering stands out as the most 
popular discipline.67 This fact reflects business preferences for certain graduate skills, 
given that firms—not universities—get to decide in which disciplines the degrees 
will be offered.68 At present, around 100,000 students are enrolled in dual study 
programs—a relatively limited share of students across the German higher education 
sector.69 Nevertheless, the rapid proliferation of dual study degrees over the last 
Figure 4. Relative intake of students by discipline in German higher education, 2005–14. 
From Gemeinsame Wissenschaftskonferenz, Hochschulpakt 2020 Bericht zur Umsetzung im 
Jahr 2014 (Bonn: Gemeinsame Wissenschaftskonferenz, 2016).
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decade and their emphasis on engineering provides additional evidence for the vital 
importance of this particular set of higher-level general skills in the German political 
economy.
Trade unions in the manufacturing sector have not been idle bystanders in this sea 
change in Germany’s educational landscape, although they have embraced its impli-
cations somewhat belatedly. In line with earlier resistance to reform of the voca-
tional training system, the dominant metalworkers’ union, IG Metall (IGM), for 
instance, continued up until the 2010s to stress in its annual reports that growth 
among apprentices remained one of its key targets.70 Only from 2012 onward did the 
union begin to shift emphasis, when IGM board member Detlef Wetzel announced 
at the annual press conference, “We will care intensely about our work to attract 
students. Universities are the largest providers of training for the sectors that we 
cater to. We will be making offers to students in order to win them over as members 
of IG Metall.”71
In the same year, the union launched an innovation fund which pledged some €20 
million annually for the recruitment of members in “strategic future fields.”72 The first 
results were reported a few years later, with new board member Christiane Benner 
declaring that the union had now become “particularly successful with prospective 
academics” and that it had “successfully addressed structural change and the trend 
towards academisation.”73 According to IGM membership data, the union indeed 
managed to recruit around 45,000 additional student members between 2012 and 
2019, although membership among students had been in decline throughout much of 
the preceding decade.74 Equally telling, perhaps, IGM also came to inaugurate its own 
higher education institute in 2019, the so-called House of Labour (on the campus of 
Goethe University Frankfurt), whose offerings include “further qualifications in the 
area of digitalization.”75 At the same time, what ultimately matters is not how many 
students may become union members but whether and how the union’s work is affected 
by the growing number of high-skilled graduates within its sectors of interest, to 
which we turn in the next section.
Taken together, recent developments in the realm of skill formation corroborate the 
argument for an employer-led destandardization. However, manufacturing employers 
not only worked toward the liberalization of the traditional apprenticeship system but 
also developed a keen interest in higher education policy. As ICT alters production 
processes in manufacturing in favor of nonroutine jobs, skill formation is “moving up” 
to a higher level. Universities are today at the core of skill formation in Germany, and 
policymakers—following business’s demands—have encouraged the higher educa-
tion sector to provide the skills (STEM and engineering in particular) considered cru-
cial for businesses to succeed in advanced, ICT-intensive manufacturing. Trade unions’ 
reactions to those developments came in two different phases. During the first decade 
of the 2000s, unions prioritized—with limited success—the preservation of the tradi-
tional pillar of skill formation in the form of the vocational training system. However, 
as vocational training gradually lost its centrality relative to higher education, unions 
underwent a process of internal adjustment that included a novel emphasis on the tar-
geted recruitment of university students.
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Industrial Relations and Labor Markets
Moving on to the realm of industrial relations, we see a broad consensus that the tra-
ditional German system of coordination has become substantially more decentralized 
since the end of the 1980s.76 The extent of the liberalization is clear in the headline 
data; trade union density fell from 31 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2016, while col-
lective bargaining coverage dropped from 85 percent to 56 percent over the same 
period.77 These changes coincided with a steady decline in the sectoral (i.e., industry-
level) collective agreements between trade unions and employers’ associations that 
were long considered the cornerstone of the German industrial relations system.78
There is mounting evidence that these trends have been observed in the industrial 
core as well as the service sector periphery. Michael Oberfichtner and Klaus Schnabel, 
for instance, analyze firm-level data from the Federal Employment Agency’s IAB 
Establishment Panel and find that the proportion of manufacturing firms covered by 
collective bargaining agreements fell from 90 percent to 67 percent in Western 
Germany and from 69 percent to 46 percent in Eastern Germany between 1996 and 
2015.79 They also highlight the countervailing rise in establishments without any col-
lective agreement at all.
Employers in the manufacturing sector have actively pushed for this transforma-
tion. The metalworking employers’ association (Gesamtmetall), for instance, lobbied 
heavily for the liberalization of industrial relations during the 2000s, not least through 
its pro-reform think-tank Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft (INSM). Daniel 
Kinderman suggests that, in contrast to the expectations of the VoC framework, 
German manufacturing employers did not defend traditional coordinated institutions 
during this period.80 Instead, they fought to give employers more discretion in labor 
relations. Beyond lobbying, Gesamtmetall took concrete steps that further eroded col-
lective bargaining institutions, such as introducing a new membership option called 
Ohne Tarifbindung (OT)—translated, “without a collective bargaining agreement”—
offering the full range of services to employers without the obligation to comply with 
the conditions set out in the sectoral agreement. The option has been popular; nearly 
one-half of all Gesamtmetall members (representing about 20 percent of employees) 
are now OT members.81
Employers in manufacturing have gained both flexibility and discretion from the 
significant changes that took place in the industrial relations sphere from the mid-
1990s. Three prominent trends that followed were the greater use of agency workers, 
the rise of domestic outsourcing, and the offshoring of a substantial number of low-
skill production jobs to Central and Eastern Europe.82 Agency workers are more inse-
curely employed and typically earn 25–30 percent less than regular staff.83 They are 
also disproportionately located in the manufacturing sector in Germany (unlike in 
other countries, such as the United States, where they are more concentrated in the 
service sector) and are predominantly unskilled, male workers.84 Along with employ-
ing more agency workers in low-skilled positions, German manufacturing firms began 
to rely increasingly on outsourcing services provided by low-skilled labor, such as 
cleaning, food, and security. Deborah Goldschmidt and Johannes Schmieder calculate 
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that outsourced workers in Germany see a drop in wages of around 10 percent.85 After 
the fall of the Iron Curtain, German manufacturing firms also took advantage of the 
opportunity to shift upstream production activities to nearby countries with similar 
institutions and education systems, but significantly lower labor costs, such as Poland 
and the Czech Republic. Offshoring reduced costs for manufacturing firms both 
directly, as foreign production workers were cheaper to employ, and indirectly, as the 
threat of offshoring reduced the bargaining power of the low-skilled production work-
ers that remained in Germany, putting downward pressure on their wages.86
What lies behind the dramatic changes that have been observed in industrial rela-
tions in the core manufacturing sectors since the mid-1990s? The CPE literature on 
Germany has almost exclusively focused on the desire of export sector firms to cut 
unit labor costs to safeguard their competitiveness in world markets.87 While this is 
clearly an important part of the story, it is hard to reconcile with the empirical evidence 
that this period saw wage growth in manufacturing strongly outstrip that in the non-
tradable sectors, as well as a rise in the wage premia of workers in exporting (over 
nonexporting) firms.88 What is missing from existing CPE explanations, then, is proper 
consideration of how high-skilled workers were affected by the transformation of the 
industrial relations system. We argue that the liberalization of industrial relations has 
provided manufacturing firms with the scope to concentrate their resources on the 
recruitment and retention of high-skilled workers, who have become central to the 
production strategies of export sector firms in the knowledge economy.
Table 3 draws on the EU KLEMS data set to show how the share of total labor 
compensation by skill group changed between 2002 and 2017 in the manufacturing 
sector.89 We can see that compensation was reorientated over this period, with 
Table 3. Share of Total Labor Compensation by Skill Group in the German Manufacturing 
Sector, 2002 and 2017.





















Note: University graduates refer to those with educational attainment at ISCED levels 5 and 6. Figures 
in parentheses are number of persons employed in each skill group.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2012 and 2019 releases of the EU KLEMS Growth and 
Productivity Accounts. Data available from http://www.euklems.net/eukisic4.shtml and https://euklems.
eu/download/. For more information on the methodology and data construction for the EU KLEMS, see 
Reitze Gouma and Marcel Timmer, “EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts 2012,” http://www.
euklems.net/data/nace2/ger_sources_12i.pdf; Mary O’Mahony and Marcel P. Timmer, “Output, Input 
and Productivity Measures at the Industry Level: The EU KLEMS Database,” Economic Journal 119, no. 
538 (2009): F374–403; Robert Stehrer et al., “Industry Level Growth and Productivity Data with Special 
Focus on Intangible Assets: Report on Methodologies and Data Construction for the EU KLEMS Release 
2019” (Vienna: Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, 2019).
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high-skilled workers gaining at the expense of unskilled workers. The numbers in 
parentheses in the table show the number of persons employed in each skill group. 
This highlights the sheer scale of the changes observed in the German manufacturing 
workforce since the turn of the century, with the sector adding over 400,000 univer-
sity-educated workers between 2002 and 2017 alone.
Turning back to compensation, university-educated workers gained the most dur-
ing this period, with their share of total compensation rising 4.4 percentage points to 
35.2 percent. Workers with intermediate skills also saw their share of labor compensa-
tion rise, but not as significantly as that of high-skilled workers. That workers with 
intermediate skills saw a moderate increase in their share of total labor compensation 
suggests that the flexibilization of labor relations in manufacturing has also benefited 
mid-skilled workers. Fabian Ochsenfeld provides a potential explanation for this.90 He 
uses linked employer-employee panel data to explore the effects of subcontracting on 
the wages of core workers without a college education and finds the effects to be posi-
tive or neutral. Thus, the adjustments in labor relations in German manufacturing since 
the mid-1990s have allowed manufacturing firms to protect and reward their core mid-
skilled workforce, alongside shifting resources toward ever more important highly 
skilled university graduates.
These dynamics can be substantiated further when exploring developments in wage 
inequality in the German manufacturing sector. We use the EU KLEMS data to calcu-
late the wage compensation ratios between the three different skill groups. Table 4 
shows how these measures have evolved since the early 2000s. Across the whole 
period, we see a substantial wage premium for university-educated workers over the 
other two skill groups. We see this premium rise rapidly in the period of economic 
expansion and skill shortage running up to the global financial crisis. We then see it 
come down gradually between 2008 and 2017, likely reflecting the marked expansion 
in the supply of university-educated workers after the Higher Education Pact of 2007 
(as shown in the previous section).
Empirical evidence from the extant literature also points to manufacturing firms 
increasingly concentrating compensation on the high-skilled workers at the center of 
their production strategies. Philipp Henze shows that the gap between the upper and 
Table 4. Wage Compensation Ratios between Skill Groups in German Manufacturing, 2002, 
2008, and 2017.
2002 2008 2017
High-skilled to low-skilled wage compensation ratio 2.30 2.85 2.72
High-skilled to medium-skilled wage compensation ratio 1.69 1.89 1.47
Medium-skilled to low-skilled wage compensation ratio 1.37 1.50 1.85
Note: High-skilled = university graduates; medium-skilled = intermediate; and low-skilled = no formal 
qualifications.
Source: Ratios calculated using methodology in Box 2.A2.1 in Annex 2.A2 of OECD, Divided We Stand: 
Why Inequality Keeps Rising (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264119536-en. 
See also Table 3 sources.
Diessner et al. 19
lower quartile of real wages has risen over time and that a key driver of this trend is 
the shift within the manufacturing sector into service occupations (which draw heavily 
on high-level, general skills that are complementary to ICT).91 We have also seen ris-
ing wage premia for workers with STEM qualifications, as well as high-skilled 
employees in exporting firms.92
The rise in bargaining power of high-skilled workers in German manufacturing and 
the freedom afforded to employers through the liberalization of industrial relations has 
culminated in a major change in focus for employers, who are increasingly directing 
their efforts and resources toward the hiring and retention of university-educated 
workers. Werner Eichhorst argues that firms are increasingly competing with one 
another to recruit and retain high-skilled workers and that entry level wages for skilled 
graduates in occupations with a shortage of workers, such as engineering, have 
improved markedly in the post–financial crisis period.93 The competition among 
employers is also increasingly stretching beyond remuneration, with firms competing 
on nonmonetary benefits including flexible working time and occupational welfare (as 
discussed further in the next subsection).94
In its regular survey of 20,000 German businesses, the Association of Chambers of 
Industry and Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag, DIHK) finds 
that a growing number of employers aim to recruit and retain skilled workers by 
improving employer attractiveness in terms of both pay and job quality.95 Among man-
ufacturing businesses in particular, the survey charts an increase from 31 percent to 42 
percent of those striving to increase employer attractiveness between 2011 and 2014 
alone, leading the DIHK to conclude that “the situation on the labor market is turning 
around—employers are now competing more and more for scarce and well-qualified 
employees.”96 Interviewees acknowledge this “war for talent” and suggest that skilled 
applicants “know their worth and thus make higher demands,” indicating that “the 
balance of power is tilting,” to an extent that “employees are now dominating the 
labor market” for STEM skills.97 In the words of one respondent, “Firms keep telling 
us that it is not the case anymore that they can go and say ‘which applicant do we 
pick?’ but rather the other way around—the applicants now go and say ‘which firm do 
I pick?’”98
The use of pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits can be seen as an attempt by 
employers to solve the “new poaching problem” they face in the knowledge econ-
omy, which is to keep hold of their high-skilled, university-educated workers.99 
Holding on to STEM graduates is a particular challenge for manufacturers. These 
workers are not only highly skilled but also exceptionally mobile, as their skills are 
prized in both high-value-added manufacturing and high-value-added service sec-
tors (e.g., finance, consultancy).100 In contrast to the VoC view of the German econ-
omy, where solving the poaching problem for mid-skilled workers relies on 
coordinated wage bargaining,101 solving the poaching problem in the knowledge 
economy is not reliant on the presence of traditional coordinating institutions. Rather, 
it appears to rely on the gradual erosion of those very institutions in order to make it 
possible for employers to attract, reward, and retain highly skilled workers as they 
deem fit.
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How have trade unions in the manufacturing sector reacted to these incisive shifts? 
Similar to the case of skill formation, unions initially displayed hesitance toward 
embracing changes in the employment landscape, holding on to the position that tech-
nological change “must not merely provide perspectives for the employment opportu-
nities of the highly qualified.”102 At the same time they continued to “care more about 
existing members . . . at the expense of new workers” and found themselves “often 
involved too late in digitalization projects at the firm-level.”103 This predisposition 
shifted once again over the mid-2010s.104 IGM, for instance, acknowledged that “digi-
talisation, network technologies and big data will lead to more ICT experts, data ana-
lysts, engineers and community managers among our workforces. [This requires] an 
even more targeted approach towards these groups of employees.”105
The union also again committed significant sums of funding to the cause, pledging 
to spend €191 million over the course of nine years from 2015 onward on recruitment 
projects as well as shifting activities and personnel from the board level to local 
units.106 This commitment reflects the “dilemma” faced by the union in the knowledge 
economy, which stems from the fact that these groups of employees “are becoming an 
increasingly important part of the manufacturing workforce [because of] the expan-
sion of highly skilled white-collar work in research and development, especially in the 
automotive industry.”107 These are the same groups that have traditionally proved to be 
“very difficult to reach over the past decades” for IGM.108
A pertinent illustration for just how central—as well as how difficult—the recruit-
ment of highly skilled knowledge workers has become for unions is the case of a 
recent transformation project by a major German manufacturing company that seeks 
to create working and living facilities for some 20,000 workers in R&D. IG Metall has 
rented valuable office space on the project site itself in order to convince employees to 
join the union by means of a “politics of small steps,” which can only be described as 
an uphill battle, given that “most of these employees come straight out of university, 
have not been socialized in a union environment, and tend to believe that they will join 
the ranks of senior management in a couple of years anyways.”109
Overall, the transition of the German manufacturing sector into the knowledge 
economy has seen IG Metall adopt a strategy that broadens the union’s perimeter 
beyond its traditional membership base, by actively attempting to bring in the type of 
high-skilled workers that have historically been underrepresented in the union. The 
eventual shift in strategy has started to bear fruits as of late: disaggregated member-
ship data show that after a prolonged decline among engineers and other technical 
experts over much of the 2000s, IGM managed to increase membership among this 
group by nearly 27 percent in the 2010s (from 126,625 members at the start of 2010 to 
160,791 members by the end of 2019).110
In summary, the industrial relations system has become substantially more liberal-
ized in the German manufacturing sector since the mid-1990s. Given the rapid pace of 
technological change, manufacturing firms have taken advantage of the greater discre-
tion liberalization has offered by shifting labor compensation away from low-skilled 
workers (temporary workers, outsourced workers, offshored workers, etc.) and toward 
high-skilled workers, who have become indispensable in the knowledge economy. 
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Manufacturing unions opposed liberalization but have recently sought to adapt to the 
increasing centrality of high skills in advanced manufacturing by aiming to attract 
more university-educated and white-collar workers into their ranks.
Social Policy
Comprehensive change has not been limited to the skill formation and industrial rela-
tions arenas. The realm of social protection has also been subject to radical trans-
formation, most prominently since the early 2000s. The parallels between social 
protection and industrial relations in terms of both outcomes and underlying political 
agency—namely, on behalf of employers’ associations spearheaded by manufactur-
ing employers—are striking. Despite its reliance on social insurance as the archetypal 
Bismarckian welfare state, the German social protection system reached “quasi-uni-
versalism” in its postwar settlement and ensured high replacement rates for both the 
unemployed and pensioners.111 The quasi-universalist principles were, however, 
increasingly challenged during the 1990s and ultimately dismantled in the 2000s. As 
in the case of industrial relations and labor market policy, employers emerged as the 
key actors behind the liberalization of the social protection system.
Business lobbying in favor of welfare state retrenchment was primarily targeted at 
unemployment benefits and pensions, two of the largest items of German public 
spending. Timo Fleckenstein and Soohyun Christine Lee demonstrate how the peak 
employer association BDA formulated an increasingly hostile stance toward unem-
ployment benefits through the second half of the 1990s.112 Manufacturing employers, 
through the Gesamtmetall-funded think-tank INSM, were equally aggressive in her-
alding the need “for far-reaching market-oriented reforms” to be achieved with or 
without unions’ consent, as well as forcefully advocating for the “necessary retrench-
ment of the unaffordable welfare state.”113 Employers targeted both the duration and 
the generosity of unemployment benefits, which they argued should be curtailed. 
Business preferences eventually came to dominate the Hartz commissions in charge of 
designing far-reaching labor market reforms, with employers’ representatives outnum-
bering unions’ representatives.114 Accordingly, the Hartz reforms of 2003–4 led to a 
profound reconfiguration of the German unemployment insurance system. The maxi-
mum duration was shortened from thirty-two to eighteen months, and the long-term 
unemployed became “only entitled to a means-tested transfer at the level of social 
assistance, leading to a reduction in the net replacement rate from 54 per cent to 17 for 
a single with a previous average wage.”115
Retrenchment had a discernible impact on both labor market insiders and outsid-
ers—despite the latter’s being more strongly affected—and its most fervent supporters 
were employers in core sectors.116 Strikingly, as in the case of industrial relations, 
much of the employers’ offensive against the generosity of unemployment benefits 
originated from the manufacturing sector, with the INSM think-tank once again being 
pivotal in the business campaign for benefit retrenchment. This poses a direct chal-
lenge to received wisdom in CPE, which suggests that the manufacturing sector, “with 
its reliance on industry-specific skills, should have been the one least interested in 
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dismantling the German model and its social insurance system.”117 Business prefer-
ences do not lend support to the proposition of dualization: indeed, employers’ behav-
ior in the late 1990s and early 2000s matches more closely with the expectations of 
liberalization theories, challenging predictions of institutional stability in Germany’s 
core industrial sectors.
As far as pensions are concerned, an analogous development can be seen through-
out the 1990s. Employers strongly advocated in favor of cuts to the public pension 
system, arguing that costs had reached unsustainable levels that would hamper German 
competitiveness in global export markets. By the end of the decade, and similar to the 
case of unemployment benefits, employers had emerged as the single most forceful 
actor setting the agenda for comprehensive retrenchment of the public pension 
system.118 Despite unions’ vocal opposition in parliamentary hearings and beyond, 
employers dominated the public debate around the 2001 pension reform, which effec-
tively slashed net replacement rates from 70 percent to 52 percent.119
It is here that the parallels with the dynamic witnessed in the sphere of industrial rela-
tions become most evident. On the one hand, and as expected from a liberalization per-
spective, employers in core sectors stood behind welfare state retrenchment, which was 
chiefly motivated by concerns around rising costs negatively affecting German firms’ 
competitiveness.120 On the other hand, however, a simple cost-cutting story provides an 
incomplete picture once again. Following the 2001 pension reforms, retrenchment in the 
public scheme was coupled with selective expansion of occupational pension plans—
pension schemes provided directly by employers. Occupational pension plans differ cru-
cially from statutory public pensions insofar as businesses have much greater control 
over their design and coverage, as they can “determine the conditions of such schemes 
or abstain from them.”121 Thus occupational pensions increase employers’ discretion and 
can be deployed far more selectively. It is important to note that occupational pensions 
developed unevenly across skill levels and have benefited skilled workers more than 
unskilled workers and, among skilled workers, those with a tertiary degree more than 
those without.122 Tobias Wiß’s detailed analysis of occupational pensions across coun-
tries and sectors—including German manufacturing—suggests that, in sectors relying 
on high skills, workers “can transfer their human capital into economic individual power, 
thereby negotiating generous occupational pensions with their employers which are in 
need of these skills (e.g. in finance and insurance and manufacturing).”123 This conjec-
ture is confirmed by interviewees, suggesting that the most highly prized workers in the 
knowledge economy, such as information technologists and data scientists, can “literally 
choose where to go” and under what conditions.124
Whereas unions voiced concern over the uneven development of occupational pen-
sions, employers did not perceive such heterogeneity in coverage to be much of an 
issue.125 To the contrary, the BDA and BDI openly promote the selective nature of 
occupational pensions as a strategic device to “attract and retain” highly skilled work-
ers, particularly those with STEM skills.126 Similarly, major insurance companies 
increasingly advertise occupational pension schemes to German employers (especially 
in the Mittelstand) as a means to target much-needed skilled personnel,127 often in the 
form of comprehensive packages including additional, targeted benefits such as 
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occupational health care and accident insurance. In this vein, despite occupational 
welfare offerings’ being a universal right for German employees, manufacturing 
employers have become those who advertise them most proactively.128
The relative lack of influence of manufacturing unions in the realm of social policy 
reflects broader trends in the union movement in Germany. IGM, among others, con-
tinues to insist that “work 4.0 requires a welfare state 4.0.”129 On the other hand, 
Hassel and Schroeder detect a growing orientation among unions toward their core 
competencies (e.g., in the realm of pay and working place conditions), which suggests 
that “compared to previous periods during which unions engaged in many fields of 
politics, they now mostly have their say only in elementary questions of their field of 
competence.”130 Nevertheless, manufacturing unions have discovered that they hold a 
number of social policy–related trump cards in their quest to convince high-skilled 
workers to join their ranks and sign up to collectively agreed settlements, relating, for 
instance, to flexible working-time arrangements that allow employees to make time 
for child and elder care.131 Although many high-skilled manufacturing workers would 
naturally become außertariflich (AT) employees and thus be paid outside of the agreed 
wage settlement, that often also entails significantly longer working hours than those 
agreed on by the social partners.132 Unions have identified this as an opportunity to 
cater precisely to these workers.133 When, in 2018, IGM successfully agreed with 
employers to offer their workforces a choice between higher pay or eight additional 
days off, some 260,000 employees opted for the latter (of which 242,000 claims were 
granted by employers).134 Such arrangements are deemed particularly attractive to 
high-skilled workers, who are assumed to strive for “a better work-life balance,” for 
instance, to dedicate time to family matters.135 Employer organizations, in turn, were 
taken aback by the success of the initiative:
Contrary to firms’ and our own expectation that people take the higher pay, many actually 
prefer the additional free time over more money. This only exacerbates the skills 
problem. . . . If I have scarce capacity of personnel, but high demand for work in my 
plants, how can I get people to work more hours rather than less?136
In sum, over the past two decades German employers have vigorously mobilized 
against generous social protection delivered through social insurance, while simulta-
neously increasing the selective provision of occupational welfare. As others have 
noted,137 the withdrawal of employers’ support for unemployment protection directly 
contradicts theories that posit continuity in the German political economy based on the 
persistent complementarity, at least in core sectors, between unemployment protection 
and investment in specific skills. Yet employers’ support for occupational welfare in 
the manufacturing industries does not fit with an unequivocal liberalization story 
either. Rather, it can best be understood in the light of the argument we put forward in 
this article: as the centrality of highly specialized but mobile workers—such as STEM 
graduates—increased, employers became supporters of selective social policies con-
ducive to “locking in” their highly-skilled personnel.138 Thus, employers’ preferences 
toward social protection in the context of the knowledge economy are concerned less 
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with incentivizing individuals to invest in specific skills and more with selectively 
rewarding and retaining tertiary-educated workers with high-level general skills. As a 
result, forms of occupational and company-based welfare—characterized by higher 
employer discretion139—have become more widespread, while relatively more encom-
passing forms of social insurance have been increasingly challenged. In the area of 
social policy, too, we observe trade unions eventually adapting to the new environ-
ment by identifying initiatives, for example, in the realm of working time arrange-
ments, that offer opportunities to cater to those highly skilled workers who would 
otherwise be difficult for them to attract.
Discussion and Conclusion
The question of how advanced democracies have transitioned from Fordism to the 
knowledge economy has been of growing interest to comparative political economists in 
recent years. As the archetypal coordinated market economy in the VoC framework, 
Germany holds a special place in this nascent literature, and competing perspectives 
have emerged concerning the degree of institutional change witnessed, as well as its 
implications for the “German model” of capitalism. In this article, we argue that the two 
leading CPE perspectives theorizing the recent evolution of the German political econ-
omy—the dualization and liberalization perspectives—miss a crucial part of the story, as 
they fail to take account of the transformative changes the ICT revolution has brought to 
the core manufacturing sectors. To address this shortcoming, we offer an alternative 
perspective—skill-biased liberalization—which conceptualizes the transition to the 
knowledge economy in Germany as a process shaped by both liberalization and techno-
logical change. We posit that technological change has meant that high-skilled workers, 
especially in STEM subjects, have become vital to the production strategies of advanced 
manufacturing firms. The centrality of this group of workers—highly specialized, but 
also highly mobile—has weakened the traditional institutional complementarities 
between specific skills, regulated industrial relations, and generous social protection.
In our skill-biased liberalization framework, institutional change takes place in 
both core and periphery and is driven by employers, including those in core manufac-
turing sectors that the dualization thesis predicts would try to safeguard traditional 
coordinating institutions. Employers pursue two parallel processes. On one hand, they 
push for liberalization to cut unskilled labor costs, and on the other they selectively 
expand wage and nonwage benefits for those highly skilled workers who are comple-
mentary in production to ICT. While the liberalization perspective sees capital as the 
winners of the transition to the knowledge economy and labor as the losers, our alter-
native perspective sees capital and highly skilled workers as the winners and labor 
lower down the skill distribution as the losers. Unions are change “takers” rather than 
change “makers” in this framework: employers drive change, often against opposition 
by unions, which eventually adapt their strategies when it becomes clear that they can-
not prevent change. This dynamic is exemplified by IGM’s recent efforts to recruit 
more university-educated workers into their ranks and to place more emphasis on the 
types of nonwage benefits that are especially valued by the highly skilled.
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Skill-biased liberalization has profound implications for the German political 
economy and for the CPE literature theorizing its evolution. Back in the 1970s, Paul 
Osterman noted that “the interesting question today is not whether the labor market 
is segmented, but rather along what lines.”140 That question is thrown into sharp relief 
by Germany’s transition to the knowledge economy. While both the dualization per-
spective and our alternative perspective of skill-biased liberalization imply that there 
is segmentation in the labor market, we provide distinct answers about where the line 
can be drawn. The dualization perspective identifies sectors of employment as the 
main sites of segmentation, with well-paid and protected workers in core manufactur-
ing sectors on one side, and low-paid and precarious workers in the service sector 
periphery on the other. By contrast, our perspective identifies skill level as the key 
dividing line in the German labor market. From this point of view, labor is divided by 
skill in both the manufacturing and service sectors as a result of technological change 
(we expect the skill divide in services to be particularly pertinent in knowledge-inten-
sive service sectors such as finance, insurance, and business services). We see a 
growing peripheral workforce in the manufacturing sector (as documented by liber-
alization scholars),141 but we also detect an ever-increasing centrality of high-skilled 
workers to advanced manufacturing (as is missing from the liberalization perspec-
tive) who obtain higher wages and nonwage benefits because of the complementar-
ity of their skills to ICT and who thus increasingly stand apart from the rest of the 
workforce.
What are the implications in terms of changing patterns of coordination in Germany 
during the transition to the knowledge economy? Our analysis suggests that Germany 
is moving further away from the original VoC conceptualization of coordination—in 
which employers and unions coordinate, with the state providing the framework nec-
essary for this coordination to take place—to a situation in which unions have become 
weaker and bilateral state-business relationships are more prominent. Our findings 
thus align with recent CPE contributions highlighting the importance of strong state-
business relationships in underpinning growth regimes in the advanced democracies in 
the twenty-first century.142
The extent to which the lens of skill-biased liberalization can be useful beyond the 
German political economy is a fruitful question for future research. Several recent 
contributions suggest that a number of CMEs in Europe—notably the Nordic countries 
and the Netherlands—have moved further out of traditional manufacturing than 
Germany and increasingly rely on high-value-added services and more ICT-intensive, 
high-technology manufacturing.143 The logic of institutional change we have identi-
fied in this article might therefore be even more pronounced in those cases than in the 
German context. As scholars embark on these questions, our framework can provide a 
useful addition to the CPE toolkit. The theoretical propositions we have summarized 
in Table 2 have two important features: they are both specific enough to be tested 
against alternative CPE perspectives and general enough to be applied to the study of 
the transition to the knowledge economy of advanced capitalist democracies beyond 
the case of Germany and its core manufacturing sector.
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Appendix
Fieldwork and Elite Interviews
We conducted a total of twenty-one semistructured elite interviews, carried out over 
three rounds of fieldwork. Interviews were semistructured insofar as each was con-
ducted with the help of a prespecified set of questions about issues of innovation and 
technological change, skill requirements and skill formation systems, labor markets 
and industrial relations, and social protection and occupational welfare, while leaving 
room for discussion of adjacent subjects where need be. The first round of fieldwork 
was carried out in 2016 with six preliminary interviews focusing on questions about 
skill requirements and higher education reform in Germany in particular. Following 
descriptive data and document collection and analysis, a second larger round of field-
work was carried out in 2019, yielding fourteen in-depth interviews on questions of 
innovation, labor markets and industrial relations, and social protection and welfare. 
Last, in order to gain further insights into the union response to technological change, 
a final interview was carried out in late 2020. Where possible, interviews were con-
ducted in person (eleven), with the remainder set up over the telephone. Most inter-
viewees were contacted and acquired directly by the authors, with a smaller number of 
initiations being the result of snowballing (recommendation and referral on behalf of 
other interviewees).
Interviewees were selected on the basis of three main criteria—affiliation, exper-
tise, and seniority—until a point of saturation was reached for each. As regards affili-
ation, the focus was on organizations at the highest level of aggregation—that is, 
industry associations and social partners, as well as their umbrella organizations—in 
order to seek out interviewees with perspectives on their fields of expertise as far-
reaching as possible. These included several industry associations of the German man-
ufacturing sector, employers’ associations and labor unions, and affiliated think-tanks 
and networks, complemented by the relevant ministries. With a view to expertise, we 
sought to obtain insights especially from those representatives who were put in charge 
of questions of innovation and industrial transformation in their respective organiza-
tions. Last, a key objective was to acquire senior and long-serving interview partners 
in particular, so as to be able to shed light on the changes that have been witnessed in 
their fields of expertise over time. Ethics approval and consent were sought before 
interviews; recordings and notes were transcribed thereafter. The full list of interview-
ees together with codes, affiliations (with short explanations), places, and dates, is 
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